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[1] Negligence-Questions of Law and Fact--Res Ipsa Loquitur.It is ordinarily a
for the fact finder, first, whether
facts which give rise to the res
loquitur inference of
neg·ligence actually exist and, second, if the inference arises,
whether it prevails or is overcome.
[2] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Control of Instrumentality.-An essential element which plaintiff must establish before the res
ipsa loquitur inference will arise is that defendant had exthe injury or, if he had
clusiYe control of the
relinquished control, that the instrumentality had not been
improprrly handled by some third person or its condition otherwise changed after control was relinquished
defendant.
[3] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Burden of Proof.-Plaintiff has the
burden of establishing the elements whieh
application
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Automobiles-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-Where a truck rolled downgrade and struck a cafe some minutes after it had been left
the driver to be checked
a mechanic, and the trial court
impliedly found that the truck was securely parked with the
brakes locked and the front wheels headed away from the
See Cal.Jur.,
See CaLJur.2d,
~ 607 et s<,q.
McK. Dig. References:
5, 6]
genee, § 136
Regligcnce, 133;

§ 300.
Am.Jur., Automobiles,
§ 156.5;
N egli7] Automobiles, § 193
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not been turned"
even if it rolled ahead
with both

nnd the driver's testimony
the mechanie's care it wns in
"if the
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with the cafe
in "double low gear,"
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that the truck had
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1uies sustained
by
and Kenneth IL Bates for
Palmer, \Vall &
Oran \V. Palmer and

Heard & James,
for Respondents.

J.-Plaintiffs
ment of the court,
recover for personal
sustained
when a
as the result of negligence of the
driver, defendant Atkins, rolled into a cafe plaintiffs operated.
\Ve have concluded that plaintiffs' contention that by reason
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine negligence of the driver was
established as a matter of law, is without merit, and that the
judgment should be affirmed.
From the record it appears that at about 8 :30 on an evening
in October, 1952, a truck being driven by defendant Atkins,
as the employe of defendants Bischel and belonging to defendant Insured Transport, Inc., developed motor trouble. Atkins
pulled off the highway and stopped the truck at the \Vheeler
Ridge Garage. At the garage he asked a methanic, McElyea,
to look at the motor, while he, Atkins, went to a nearby cafe
to telephone to his employer. Atkins, who then left the truck
while the mechanic was checking the engine, testified that at
that time he had the equipment in double low gear with the
vacuum brakes on and the mechanieal hand emergency brake
set. In Atkins' six to eight years of experience as a truck
driver there is no more effective way to apply braking power
on sueh equipment, and it was parked in a safe manner.
Atkins then walked some 250 feet to the cafe, which plaintiffs
operated, and wa,; making his telephone calls when the truck
struck the cafe building; about seven to nine minutes had
elapsed since he had left the truck. During a part of that
time the mechanic was working in or about the truck. Atkins
had been driving this particular rig about two and one-half
months and had had no previous brake trouble; on the day
of the accident he had applied the brakes many times, always
successfully. 'When he parked the truck, after being told by
the mechanic that "it would be all right to set the truck
there,'' both the truck and the front wheels were facing

The
testified as a 'witness
the truck to go to the cafe
the brakes -vvere on and Atkins
Atkins said that he would make a
come back and "we \Yould cheek it out more"; that the witness spent another two to
minutes
at the motor,
during which time he did not "have the motor running,"
and then fOllowed Atkins to the
and had
ordered
or was about to order coffee when the truck struck the building; that the witness then went outside and looked into
the cab of the truck and determined that the transmission
was in gear as to one gear box although he had not looked
inside the cab before going to the cafe; that he did not look
at more than one gear box; that the ''general lay of the land
in the vicinity of where the truck stopped'' is such that
"(h(ite a
think it 'is level there . . . The grade is very
deceiving" (italics added); that some tnwk drivers use blocks
under the whe(']s when tlwy stop there and some do not, and
the witness d·id not ca·t.dion Atlc1:ns to t~se blocks on this
occasion, no1· did he himself put blocks 1l11der the truck before he left it to go to the eafe; that the truck was "absolutely
dead stationary" when the witness left it and had been
stationaTy for at least two to four minutes after Atkins hacl
stoppccl the motoT; that he did not remember whether at the
time he left the truck and went to the cafe there v;ere any
other people in the general area, although commonly there are
people "around there all hours of the night."
The trial court found that it '>Vas not true that Atkins
negligently handled the truck and proximately caused the
accident. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the accident was
"unexplained" and that because it was unexplained the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine applies and thereby establishes Atkins'
negligence as a matter of law, while defendants urge that
the doctrine does not apply as
them because the truck
was under the control of the mechanic rather than of Atkins

331

a
inference
[2] The essential elements which
establish before the inference will arise have often
and include the
that defendant had exclusive control of the thing
the injury or, if he had
then a showing that the instrumentality
had not been improperly handled by some third person or
its condition otherwise changed after control was relindefendant.
v. She1·win 1Villiarns Co. (1954),
691~692
[268 P.2d 1041]; Zentz v. Coca
Co.
39 Cal.2d 436, 444 [6] r247 P.2d
; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
, 24 Cal.2d
457
P.2d 436] .)
'l'he evidence in this case, as above noted, shows that the
defendant Atkins, had left the truck, in double low
gear and with the brakes locked, in the care of the mechanic
.McElyea, who wns
the motor, a]1(1 that Atkins had
himself been absent from the truck for seven to nine minutes
before the accident occurred. Dnring a substantial portion
of that time lVIcElyea was
on or about the truck.
[3] Plaintiffs, who have the burden of establishing the elements which permit applieation of the res ipsa loquitur docMcElyea as their witness. His testimony
was not binding on defendants. [4] I1'rom the facts that
McElyea was not named as a party defendant and was in
sense an interested party on plaintiffs' behalf and, in his
adverse to
the court could well
part of the accident,
insofar aB credible
was
was what happened to the truck after Atkins had left it in McElyea's care.
That
the court could well have believed, as it impliedly
did, that Atkins' explanation of his own conduct was fully
and excluded negligence on his part but that
either it was unacceptable, and
act of the latter was actually the sole proximate
cause of the
or that it was accrptable and indicated
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that the act of
unidentified person must have intervened
and caused the accident. As
McElyea himself
testified that he was aware of the
that it was "very
deceiving,'' but that he did not caution defendant Atkins
concerning
or himself
blocks under the wheels, and
that he left the truck unattended
commonly there
were people ''around
hours of the
'' Since
McElyea was asked to
attention to the motor trouble
and was trying to ''check it out'' it would seem reasonable
that he might
to start the motor; he had asked Atkins, as
the latter started for the
if the brakes were on. If he
tried to start it, it wouM br reasonable to disengage the gears.
Since the trial court impliedly found that the truck was
securely parked with the brakes locked and with the front
wheels headed away from the cafe building when Atkins left
it, but rolled away and turned toward the building only after
McElyea had given it his attention and then left it unattended,
it would be logical to conclude that McElyea or some unidentified person must have changed its condition, and that
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine ·was not applicable as against
defendants.
[5] If, however, the trial court did conclude that facts
existed which gave rise to the res ipsa inference, nevertheless, as commented in Druzanich v. Oriley (1942), Stlpra,
19 Cal.2d 439,444 [4] [122 P.2d 53], that doctrine even where
applicable does not give a plaintiff an absolute right to a
judgment in every case, and when the defendant produces
evidence to rebut the inference of negligence it is ordinarily
a question of fact whether the inference has the greater
weight, or is evenly balanced, or has been dispelled or overcome. [6] Thus, in Scott v. Bm·ke (1952), 39 Cal.2d 388,
398-401 [247 P.2d 313], it was held that the presumptions
of due eare and innocenee (Code Civ. Pro e., § 1963, subds.
1, 4) may be weighed by the fact finder and eonstitute sufficient evidence to support a finding that the res ipsa loquitur
inference has been overeome, and that "it is the function
of the trier of facts to determine in the light of all the evidence
in the case, including the opposing inferences and presumptions, whether the proof preponderates in favor of one party
and against another, or is
balaneed, and thereupon to
resolve the issues in aceordance with the rules relating to the
burden of proof." (P. 399 of 39 Cal.2d.)
[7] Thus even though we assume that the court eould
have concluded here, as in the Scott case, that the cause of

Nov.

333

the accident remained
of both Atkins and the '"~'"'"'"'"v·

doctrine. Atkins'
left the truck in care of the
meehanic it was in suc·h a
and was so headed that
"if the
wheel had not been turned" it ·would not
have collided with the cafe eveu if: it rolled ahead, and that
it was in "double low gear," "the combination making the
compression most
'' and with both meehanical and
vacuum brakes on and locked, coupled 1vith testimony of the
mechanic that the truck had remained "absolutely dead stationary" for several minutes after Atkins had stopped the
motor and before the mec·.hanic had himself left the truck
completely unattended, and that following the accident the
mechanic had looked at one gear box and determined that as
to it the transmission >vas in gear, and the further facts
that the mechanic was not named as a defendant but instead
testified on behalf of plaintiffs, obviously provide evidence
sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Atkins
was free from negligenee proximately causing the aecident.
Price v. McDonald (1935), 7 Cal.App.2d 77, 81 [45 P.2d
425], and Harlow v. Standard hnp. Co. (1904), 145 Cal.
477 [78 P. 1045}, eited by plaintiffs, involve the applicability
of the res ipsa doctrine in providing supporting evidence for
judgments for plaintiffs and are not in point where, as here,
sufficiency of the evidence to
judgment for de·
fendants is the matter at issue.
Plaintiffs further suggest that the findings as to their
damages are eontradictory in that, aceording to plaintiffs'
construction, the eourt found both that plaintiffs suffered no
damages and that eertain damage inflicted upon the cafe
building was caused to be repaired. 'Without reriting the
findings in detaiL it is apparent that the finding that plaintiffs
suffered no damages referred to damages proximately resulting from ncgligenee of the defendants. Further, the
finding, also attaeked by plaintiffs, that plaintiffs were guilty
of misrepresentation which induced defendants to cause the
building to be repaired in such a manner as to enhance its
value in excess of $2,800 is immaterial in view of the finding

J.-I dissent.
The basis for the
loquitur is found in ihe
kinds of accidents do not occur in the absenee
conduet
the person in eontrol of the
ing the accident. A
of the oeeurrenee of
then, raises an inferenee that the one in control
was negligent and it becomes incumbent upon him to satisfactorily explain the cause of the
in order to avoid
liability (Burr v. Sherw-in lVilliams
42 Cal.2d 682, 691
[268 P.2d 1041] ).
An examination of the faets in this case shows that they
are particularly susceptible to the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine. 'l'he defendant
Atkins, left the
truck, which weighed several tons, unattended while he went
to a cafe. The uncontradicted testimony of the mechanic,
not a party to the
shows that the eondition of the truck
was not
after Atkins left. A few minutes after
Atkins left the scene, the truck crashed through the side of
the cafe which was some 250 feet downgrade from where the
truck was parked. Clearly, parked vehicles do not roll downhill unless the operator was negligent, either in parking the
vehicle or in maintaining its braking equipment in proper
mechanical order.
v.
7 Cal.App.2cl 77 [45
P.2d 425] .) The first question that arises, then, is whether
the trier of fact can refuse to draw the infcrenee that Atkins
was negligent. In discussing this problem in Burr v. Sherwin
Williams
supra, this court said at page 689 that "In
some types of situations, because of the nature of the particular accident, an inference of negligence upon the part
of the defendant may be so strong that no reasonable man
eould fail to aecept it in the absenec of explanatory evidence.''
Put another \Yay, " . . . if the inferenee is suffieiently strong
to persuade the
and the obvious conelnsion
that the
defendant has been negligent, no perverse
should be
permitted to refuse to draw it. If the thing speaks for it-
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Res Ipsa
220.)
and for

" and this inference
man could fail to
it."
also examined in Bur1· v
at page
where Mr. Chief
for a unanimous court, said that

<ea.ov'«"J'"'

an inference which is
tr·ier
fact may
as it sees fit, even though
the defendant offers no
rrhis view,
1vhich is inconsistent with most of the California decisions,
very difficult to apply, and there are snbstantial reasons
we should hold that in every type of res ipsa loquitur
case the defendant should have the bnrden of meeting the
inference of negligence . . . .
"It is our conclusion that in all r-e.~ ipsa loqnit n1· situations
fhe defendant must present evidence sufficient to meet or
halance the
of neuligcnce, and that the Jurors should
be insfrnctecl that, if the defendant fails to do so, they should
the
" (Emphasis added.)
In regard to what a defendant must show in order to meet
the burden imposed by the inference of neg1igence, the court
in Talbert v. Osteruaard, 129 Cal.App.2d 222, 228 [276 P.2d
8801, said: "Procedurally, it is incumbent on defendant to
rebut the inference
a
' "either (J of a sa tisexplanation of the accirlent, that
an affirmative
of a definite canse for the aecident, in which cause
no rlemrnt of negligenee on the part of the defendant inheres,
of such care in all possible
as necessarily to
lead to the conc1nsion that the accident conld not have hapfrom want of care, but must have been dne to some
(~anse, alt1wng-h the exact eam;e is unknown.
the latter case, inasmneh as the process of reasoning is one
the eare slwwn must be
in the sense
it covers al1 causes wl1irh due care on the
of the
(tefendant might haYe preYentrd.'' '
v. Providence
31 Cal.2d 290. 295
P.2r1 121.) In short, the
which the defendant is
to make is an

[47 0.2d
it must be as
67 Cal.App.2d
the sufficiency
aeddent or the sufficiency
of fact for the
the

Applying these standards
abundantly elear
that defendant has not offered evidence suffieient to overcome
the inference of
there was no explanation of the cause of the accident. It appears equally
obvious that there is insuffic-ient evidence of "due care in all
possible respeets. '' Defendant's
explanation is that he
left the gears engaged and the brake locked. This does not
amount to "an explanation as broad as the inference." Except for th mechanic's testimony that one of the gear boxes
was in gear (no braking power would be afforded unless
both gears 1vere engaged), there was no evidence as to the condition of the gears and brakes after the accident. Such evidence would certainly be of assistanee in determining the
cause of and responsibility for the accident, and, presumably,
such evidence was within defendant's power to produce as
he drove the truek after the accident. Yet, no snch evidence
was offered. Under similar circmnstances, it was said in
Tnlbcrt v. Ostergaard, snp1·a, at page 229, that "'l'he failure
of a defendant to produce evidence explaining a circumstance of importance in the ease, if such evidence is available,
justifies an inference that such evidence, if given, would redound to his prejudice. [
'fhis principle applies
with particular foree where, as here, the circumstance to be
explained arises in relation to defendant's burden of meeting
an inference of negligence.'' The only conelnsion, then, that
can be drawn is that defendant has not done all within his
power to explain the aeeident and, therefore, it should be held
that he has failed to overcome the inference of negligence.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment.

